The case centred around a dispute between Balber Takhar and the Krishans (Mrs Krishan and her husband, Dr Krishan). Mrs Takhar was the owner of several properties in Coventry. In around 2004, she was going through financial difficulties—some of the properties were run down and there were issues of rate arrears. She met with her cousin Mrs Krishan, and it was later decided in 2005 that the properties were to be transferred to Gracefield Developments Ltd (a new company, with shareholdings equally divided between Mrs Takhar, Mrs Krishan and Dr Krishan). The properties were put on the market for sale in 2008. However, Mrs Takhar objected to the sale, and in October that year she brought proceedings against the Krishans and Gracefield. She claimed that the properties were only beneficially transferred to Gracefield, and alternatively that the transfer was a result of undue influence or was unconscionable.

Mrs Takhar and the Krishans argued on the basis of fundamentally different understandings of the transfer. Mrs Takhar argued that it was not intended that the properties would be sold, but rather that they were to be “done up” at the efforts of the Krishans, with the costs met through renting out the properties. On the other hand, the Krishans contended that there was an agreement by which the properties would be sold and Mrs Takhar would receive a previously agreed sum of £300,000 from the proceeds (with any further profits equally divided between the Krishans and Mrs Takhar). In particular, at trial the Krishans relied on an agreement which appeared to be signed by Mrs Takhar, and which reflected these terms. Mrs Takhar argued that she had not signed the agreement, but she did not allege at the trial that the Krishans had been fraudulent. In 2010, Judge Purle dismissed Mrs Takhar’s claim.

In 2013, Mrs Takhar brought new proceedings, alleging that her signature on the agreement (and on other documents that the Krishans had relied on at trial) was forged. In support of this, she had obtained evidence after the trial from a handwriting expert who gave the opinion that her signature from another document had been “transposed” onto the agreement. In light of this evidence, she sought to rescind or set aside Judge Purle’s judgment on the ground that it had been obtained through fraud.

The Krishans applied to strike out Mrs Takhar’s claim on the ground of abuse of process and argued that, for a judgment to be set aside on the grounds of fraud, the plaintiff must show that the new evidence relied on could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at the time of the original trial. Newey J in the High Court held that there was no such requirement.2 This conclusion was based on both policy and an