The law of constructive trusts has never been straightforward. Commendably, Elias sets out to rationalize what others regard as a disparate collection of rules with the intention of providing an informative conceptual structure. The author rejects the view advanced by Waters in The Constructive Trust (1964) that the constructive trust should be recognized as a remedy for unjust enrichment. Instead he claims that the law in this area is motivated by the desire to further three aims: (1) perfection of promises, (2) restitution and (3) reparation of loss (p. 4). While the author’s conclusions regarding the first two aims are by no means uncontroversial, his discussion in relation to the third purported aim of constructive trust law is the most puzzling. Is the reparation of loss within the scope of the constructive trust at all? Difficulties stem from the author’s failure to articulate precisely what he is referring to when he speaks of “constructive trusts”. The readers could be forgiven for expecting the book to concentrate on situations in which a constructive trust is actually imposed. Elias, however, also uses it to refer to rules which provide for knowing assisters to be liable for their involvement in breaches of trust, e.g. Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Craddock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555 (p. 28). In this situation the assisters liability is purely personal, as he or she has retained no property belonging to the trustee. No constructive trust is actually imposed. It has been argued for some time that this situation should be regarded, not as part of the law of constructive trusts, but as separate rule of equity; alternatively it could be dealt with by the law of negligence.

Thus, Elias tends to treat the proprietary aspect of the constructive trust as an incidental