One of the objectives of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (“COGSA 92”) was to simplify the law, by removing the hideous complexities that had bedevilled its precursor, the Bills of Lading Act 1855, s.1, of timing and cause of passing of property.1 The general scheme of the Act, at least where a negotiable bill is issued, is simply to transfer title to lawful holders, a question which, it seems, was not expected to be difficult.2 At first instance in The Erin Schulte,3 Teare J, observing that the aim of the 1992 Act was to “simplify the law as to the transfer of rights under a bill of lading”,4 applied it in a straightforward and simple way, largely rejecting complex distinctions.5 His decision has been upheld in the Court of Appeal,6 but on very different grounds. However, though lip service is no longer paid to the quest for simplicity, which it is now clear is difficult to achieve, the judgment in the Court of Appeal is, in reality, no more complex than that of Teare J.

The case concerned an action by a confirming bank to sue the shipowner, for delivery without production of an original bill of lading, the issue being title to sue under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.